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Abstract 
This paper examines the characteristics and variations within firms’ 10-K filings over a 20 
year time period. We find that investors’ reaction to textual characteristics of the MD&A in 
10-Ks is much stronger and more timely than their reaction to textual characteristics of the 
notes to the financial statements. Characteristics of the MD&A and footnotes are also 
predictive of future returns, volatility, and firm profitability. Our evidence suggests that 
investor pay limited attention to the footnotes compared to the MD&A and that firms exploit 
biases in investors’ information processing through their disclosure choices within 10-K 
filings.  
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1. Introduction 
Are companies’ annual 10-K filings informative to investors? And if so, what parts of a 
10-K are informative? By the time 10-K reports are filed most of the key financial 
information such as earnings, sales growth etc., is already in the public domain. Not 
surprisingly, early evidence fails to find any significant market reaction to 10-K filings 
(Easton and Zmijewski, 1993) or only finds a limited reaction to these filings once prior 
earnings releases are taken into account (Li and Ramesh, 2009). On the other hand, more 
recent evidence from textual analyses of 10-K reports finds incremental information content 
in the tone of the text in the 10-K (Feldman, Givindaraj, Livnat, and Segal, 2010; Loughran 
and McDonald, 2011), in its readability (Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2014), in year-
on-year changes to the MD&A section (Brown and Tucker, 2011; Cohen, Malloy, and 
Nguyen, 2015) and in specific footnote disclosures (Peterson, 2012; Peterson, Schmardebeck, 
and Wilks, 2015).1 These findings seem to suggest that there is incremental information 
about a firm’s prospects beyond the financial statements in the narrative text of the 10-Ks. 
Previous research has focused primarily on the stock market’s reaction to individual 
components of 10-K filings, such as the MD&A alone or particular types of footnotes (e.g. 
pensions, stock options, significant accounting policies) in isolation, or conversely to the 10-
K filing as a single piece of homogeneous information. Yet, the psychology literature 
provides ample evidence that attention diverts depending on the salience of stimuli––their 
prominence and contrast with other information in the environment (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
As a result, it matters not only what is disclosed, but also where and in combination with 
what else. For example, if salience of the footnotes to the financial statements in the 10-K is 
low (or lower than of the Management Discussion and Analysis), investors might fail to 
process the information provided in them; or if information is abstract and heavily loaded 
                                                          
1 The practitioner literature also provides ample anecdotal evidence of value in reading companies’ annual 
reports (e.g., Schilit and Perler 2010). 
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with statistical and quantitative data, people tend to underweight it in their decision making 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). As a consequence, some 
information in 10-Ks might be revealed less completely and less immediately in market 
prices because investors under-react to it (Hirshleifer 2001; Bloomfield 2002). 
In this paper we examine and compare the information content of several characteristics 
of two of the most prominent narrative sections in 10-Ks: the Management’s Discussion & 
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (commonly known as 
Management’s Discussion & Analysis, or the MD&A) and the Notes to the Financial 
Statements (footnotes). Unlike previous work, we study 10-K filings in their entirety, while 
controlling for correlated information within a filing (i.e., information that is reported in both 
the footnotes and the MD&A). Jointly examining MD&A and footnote disclosures allows us 
to infer which part of the narrative in a 10-K filing investors pay attention to, controlling for 
information characteristics in different parts of a 10-K. We study the cross-sectional variation 
in the market reaction to firms’ MD&A and footnote disclosures and their informativeness 
about future stock returns and profitability concentrating on textual characteristics of these 
sections within industries, within firms, and across time. 
Prior evidence suggests that investors have limited attention and suffer from information 
processing biases when interpreting company disclosures (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Peng 
and Xiong 2006) and that placement and categorization of accounting information plays an 
important role for their interpretation (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002). Limited 
attention leads investors to use short cuts, and use information in the way it is displayed or 
presented instead of adjusting it if necessary (Slovic, 1972; Payne et al 1993). Information 
might thus not be fully processed or only processed with errors by investors.  
Investors’ limited rationality then affords managers the opportunity to strategically report 
information to their advantage (Schrand and Walther, 2000) and to exploit differences in the 
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visibility of disclosure outlets. For example, managers might strategically shift or omit 
pessimistic language from a more visible disclosure outlet to another less salient one (Davis 
and Tama-Sweet, 2012) or opportunistically structure annual reports to hide adverse 
information from investors (Li, 2008). 
Although 10-K filings are legally required, i.e., mandatory, disclosures, managers have 
some discretion in content and form of the disclosure (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010; 
Schipper, 2007; Cole & Jones, 2005), as for example in their choice of words, their 
judgement of what is material and requires disclosure, and in their choice of how much 
forward-looking information to disclose. There are substantial differences between the two 
main narrative sections, however: the MD&A contains more contextual disclosure, with safe 
harbour provisions for forward-looking statements and significant discretion for 
management; the footnotes tend to be more technical, must comply with accounting 
standards, and are audited. It is thus likely that these sections differ in the type of information 
they contain and in the way the same information is presented and hence in their 
informativeness and ease of interpretation for investors. In this paper we demonstrate that 
several characteristics of these disclosures on their own and relative to each other are 
predictive of contemporaneous and future stock returns, volatility and profitability. 
We build a sample of MD&A and footnote disclosures from 10-K filings for all US firms 
that file with the SEC, from 1993 (the start of EDGAR electronic filing) to 2014. From each 
10-K we computationally extract the text of two sections, the MD&A and the footnotes. The 
MD&A and footnotes provide the vast majority of narrative disclosures in 10-K reports. We 
construct a number of variables that measure the characteristics of these disclosures. We 
measure their (1) length and (2) the amount of year-on-year changes in the text to capture 
information content and new information; (3) the similarity of a particular firm’s MD&A and 
footnotes to that of other firms in the same industry reflecting idiosyncratic and industry 
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information; (4) the similarity between the MD&A and footnotes within a given firm-year; 
reflecting common information to both sections and (5) the tone in and differences in tone 
between the MD&A and footnotes to capture sentiment and strategic disclosure.  
Our main findings are as follows. MD&A disclosures are more informative to investors 
than footnote disclosures in the immediate days surrounding the 10-K filing, particularly with 
respect to firm specific information as opposed to information common to the industry. Our 
results suggest that firms’10-K narratives that break from the default choice of simply 
repeating last year’s narrative or from being boilerplate disclosures commonly used within 
the industry are informative to investors. For example, a one standard deviation of MD&A 
year-on-year textual change is associated with a 37 basis point increase in absolute 
announcement returns and a one standard deviation increase in MD&A industry similarity is 
associated with 13 basis points lower absolute returns. At the same time, investors seem to 
pay less attention to footnotes around the filing days, find them less informative or require 
more time to process them compared to MD&A disclosures.  
More strikingly, we find that the change in the MD&A is strongly negatively associated 
with filing abnormal returns as is less congruence between the MD&A and footnotes. A 
departure from previous year’s MD&A text and gaps between what managers convey in the 
MD&A and what they are required to disclose in the footnotes on average signal negative 
information to investors. However, consistent with limited attention or high processing costs, 
we also find that investors generally under-react to the negative information as these 
characteristics are highly predictive of negative future (one year ahead) stock returns after 
controlling for risk factors as well as associated with significantly lower future operating 
performance.  
We further find evidence that positive tone in the MD&A is predictive of higher future 
risk-adjusted returns while positive tone in the footnotes is predictive of negative future risk-
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adjusted returns as well as negative future accounting performance indicating that 
management might be trying to obscure negative information contained in the quantitative 
details of the footnotes with a positive tone in their text. Consistent with this interpretation we 
document a U-shaped relationship between “sentiment spread” (the difference between 
MD&A sentiment and footnote sentiment) and future returns and profitability. For profitable 
firms, sentiment spread is predictive of improved future performance. However, for firms in 
the bottom quartile of profitability, the further management’s tone in the MD&A diverges 
from the footnote tone levels, the worse is future performance.  
The findings in this study suggest that investors have difficulties in reading and 
processing the complex information contained within a 10-K filing in a timely manner. Our 
results are also suggestive of managerial obfuscation in the face of poor results, particularly 
in the MD&A section that attracts more attention from investors and which affords 
management more discretion in their disclosure.  
Our study contributes to the literature that investigates the informativeness of 10-K 
filings and their textual characteristics. Event studies on filings of 10-K reports have 
produced mixed results, in particular after information that is released in earnings 
announcements is taken into account (Easton and Zmijewski, 1993; Li and Ramesh, 2009; 
You and Zhang 2009). However, there is a growing literature that uses textual analyses of 10-
K reports to examine the information content of the tone in these reports and finds the tone to 
be informative (Feldman, Givindaraj, Livnat, and Segal, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011).  Other studies use textual characteristics to measure the readability of 10-K reports 
and find that firms with more complex reports have lower future performance (Li, 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald 2014). Changes in the text from one reporting period to the next 
also seem to reflect negative information and are associated with negative future stock returns 
(Brown and Tucker, 2011; Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen, 2015).  
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Our paper contributes to this line of research by comparing the narratives in MD&A and 
footnote disclosures, two of the most prominent narrative sections in 10-K filings, across and 
within firms for a large sample over two decades. Prior studies do not allow us to draw 
conclusions about which sections in the 10-K contain relatively more valuable information 
for investors, which characteristics of these sections are important and whether there is 
information content in industry and firm comparisons as well as when comparing different 
sections within the same 10-K. We examine several textual characteristics of the narratives in 
the MD&A and the footnotes to explore their information content and test their predictive 
power for future stock returns and profitability.    
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature and develops our 
key hypotheses. Section 3 discusses methodology and data. Section 4 presents summary 
statistics and Section 5 follows with the main regression results and their interpretation. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.1. Prior literature 
Research on investor reactions to 10-K filings finds that investors react promptly to the 
filing of 10-Ks, suggesting that they contain marginal information above what is contained in 
the earnings announcement prior to the 10-K disclosure (Griffin, 2003; You and Zhang 
2009). You and Zhang (2009) show that abnormal announcement returns around 10-K filing 
dates are positively associated with future firm profitability. However, the authors also 
document a stock price drift over the following 12 months and interpret this as evidence of 
investor underreaction to the information in the 10-K filing. They further find that the under-
reaction is stronger for firms with more complex 10-K filings, as measured by filing length. 
These findings stand in contrast to earlier work that finds little support for investors 
responding to 10-K and 10-Q report filings (Easton and Zmijewski, 1993). In concurrent 
 7 
 
research to ours, Cohen, Malloy, and Ngyuen (2015) find that year-on-year changes in the 
text of 10-K and 10-Q reports are predictive of future negative stock returns and future risk of 
litigation. 
Early research on textual analysis of financial reports studies the readability of corporate 
annual reports. Schroeder and Gibson (1990), for example, calculate word length, sentence 
length, use of passive voice, and Flesch Index for the Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A), footnotes, and President’s Letter for 40 Fortune 500 companies from 1986. The 
authors explicitly acknowledge the inherent differences between the MD&A and footnotes as 
disclosure outlets: “Flexibility is allowed in presenting the MD&A while specific guidelines 
shape the footnotes. Also, there is a tendency to use boilerplate in footnote disclosure” 
(Schroeder & Gibson, 1990, p. 80). The authors find significantly more use of the passive 
voice in the MD&A, although there are no other differences in readability, word, or sentence 
length between the MD&A and footnotes.2 In more recent research, Li (2008) finds that firms 
with easier to read annual reports have more persistent positive earnings, and that poorly 
performing firms have harder to read annual reports. Similarly, Loughran and McDonald 
(2014) shows that the file size (in megabytes) of a 10-K is a simple and reliable measure of 
readability, and is positively associated with abnormal return volatility in the post-filing 
trading month, absolute standardised unexpected earnings (SUE), and analyst dispersion.3 
Several papers investigate particular footnote disclosures. De Franco, Wong, and Zhou 
(2011) use adjustments from Moody’s models as a proxy for financial note information (i.e., 
adjustments that are made after the filing of the 10-K), and find that 10-K filing returns are 
                                                          
2 Schroeder and Gibson (1990) cite papers highlighting the poor readability of footnotes from over 50 years ago, 
as for example in Soper and Dolphin Jr (1964). Li (2010b) provides a thorough literature review of earlier work 
on textual analysis of accounting disclosures. 
3 The authors also argue that other measures of readability, such as the “fog”-index in Li (2008), which is a 
function of numbers of words per sentence and proportion of complex words, are not reliable. However, Bonsall 
IV, Leone, and Miller (2015) show that file size itself might not be a reliable measure of readability. They show 
that the measure is in fact driven by other exhibits in the 10-K filing (images, HTML, XML, and pdf 
attachments) and propose other “plain English” measures of readability, although these are not easily calculable.  
We note that there does not currently seem to be a consensus in the literature on the best (and most 
parsimonious) way to measure readability of 10-K reports. 
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related to the sign and magnitude of adjustments, as are equity analysts’ target prices and 
recommendations. Peterson (2012) uses the length of the revenue recognition policy 
disclosure (and the number of methods of recognition) as a proxy for accounting complexity. 
This proxy is related to higher incidences of revenue misreporting restatements. Meanwhile, 
Peterson, Schmardebeck, and Wilks (2015) measure accounting consistency as the cross-
sectional (within-industry) and year-on-year similarity of firms’ accounting policies footnote. 
They find that firms with higher time series consistency have higher quality earnings. Higher 
cross-sectional similarity is also related to lower absolute discretionary accruals.4 
In their survey and interviews of public company CFOs and standard-setters Dichev, 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) highlight a number of footnote disclosure issues 
associated with poor earnings quality, or earnings quality “red flags”. These include levels of 
disclosure that differ from industry norms, changes in accounting policies, and complex 
footnotes. 
Research has also investigated the MD&A section of the 10-K in more detail (Bryan 
1997; Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat and Segal, 2010; Brown and Tucker, 2011). Feldman et 
al. (2010) document an association between positive (negative) tone in the MD&A and higher 
(lower) contemporaneous returns. Brown and Tucker (2011), on other hand, calculate the 
year-on-year change of the text in the MD&A using a vector space model (VSM) cosine 
similarity. They find that disclosures change in response to economic changes in the firm, and 
that investors react to disclosure changes around the filing date of the 10-K. They find, 
however, that this effect has diminished over time and attribute it to an increase in boilerplate 
disclosure. 
  
                                                          
4 There are many other papers that show that individual footnotes contain valuable information about firm 
profitability and earnings characteristics (e.g. Graham, Raedy, & Shackelford, 2012)  
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2.2. Key hypotheses 
We examine the information content of mandatory disclosures in 10-K filings that are 
not necessarily driven by managerial incentives and agency considerations as are voluntary 
disclosure choices. We are nevertheless mindful of discretion within and differences between 
the various disclosure sections of a 10-K report. In particular, we expect the two main 
narrative disclosure outlets in a 10-K filing––the Management’s Discussion and Analysis, 
and the Notes to the Financial Statements––and differences between them in form and 
visibility to determine where and how managers provide mandatory information to investors. 
We base our empirical tests on hypotheses that follow from the prior literature. Prior 
evidence suggests that the length of disclosures is related to their information content and 
also their complexity (Schroeder and Gibson, 1990; You and Zhang, 2009). Consequently, 
we expect the total length of the narrative disclosures in the MD&A and footnotes to be 
associated with absolute and signed filing returns and test whether one of the outlets is on 
average relatively more informative holding the total length constant. On the one hand, the 
MD&A is considered one of the most important sections of the 10-K (Rogers and Grant 
1997) and contains forward looking information protected by the safe harbour provisions of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995, which should make it more informative 
than footnotes. On the other hand, the MD&A is not audited like footnotes and there are 
concerns that is contains mainly boilerplate and generic disclosures (SEC, 2003).  
As disclosure length has also been used as proxy for the complexity (or readability) of 
disclosures (Li, 2008), we further try to distinguish between the informativeness of the 
MD&A and footnotes and their complexity by examining the association of the length of the 
two outlets with future return volatility. If market participants are less easily able to extract 
information from complex reports we expect more uncertainty to remain about the firm after 
the filing of the 10-K leading to higher return volatility. 
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Moreover Bloomfield (2003) argues that information that is more costly to extract from 
public data is less likely to be completely revealed in market prices. Such “incomplete 
revelation” might arise due to the complexity and extraction costs of the information or due 
to limited attention of investors as in Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). If investors do not react 
fully to the disclosed information we expect the characteristics of the narrative disclosures to 
be associated with future stock returns and volatility. Moreover, managers might have 
incentives to exploit investors’ limited attention by increasing the complexity in their 
disclosures or choosing a particular form or outlet of the disclosure when the information is 
negative (Schrand and Walther, 2000; Bloomfield, 2002). We then expect market participant 
to only slowly adjust to the new (negative) information leading to a negative association of 
characteristics of the disclosures with long-term stock returns and profitability. 
The notion that managers are likely biased against disclosing negative information 
(Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009) might not only affect the complexity of the disclosure, but 
also the location and disclosure outlet. For example, managers strategically shift or omit 
pessimistic language from earnings press releases to the MD&A in 10-Q and 10-K filings 
(Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012). This shifting behaviour is predictive of low future firm 
profitability. Similarly, Li (2008) argues that “managers may be opportunistically structuring 
annual reports to hide adverse information from investors” (p. 245). Meanwhile, experimental 
evidence suggests that the placement and categorization of information plays an important 
role for how investors interpret the information (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002) and 
early evidence in psychology has shown that people tend to underweight abstract and 
statistical information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Accordingly, 
we expect the characteristics of the footnotes to be more likely associated with negative 
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future stock returns as investors tend to under-react to the information contained in them 
around the filing date.5 
Firms are generally reluctant to deviate from default choices in the language and 
structure of their annual reports unless absolutely necessary. There is a tendency to use 
boilerplate language and to include too much information in order to satisfy compliance with 
standards (Hoogervorst, 2013). That is, it is natural to expect firms to simply repeat content 
and sentence structures in the MD&A and footnotes from one year to the next if there is no 
new material information to be presented to investors. Similarly, these disclosures should be 
similar across firms within the same industry reflecting wider economic and industry trends 
unless idiosyncratic events have affected the individual firm. In other words, a disclosure that 
changes provides information both through the new content, and through the fact that a 
decision was made to change the disclosure. We therefore further test informational content 
of the narrative disclosures by examining changes and similarities across industry peers, 
within firms and disclosure outlets over time.  
We expect changes over time and differences across industry peers to reveal information 
to investors. Firms would not deviate from the default choice if there was no news and are 
likely to contain previous statements in the disclosure to obfuscate additional sentences that 
signal negative information. We expect negative information signals in particular in relation 
to changes that occur in the MD&A, where management has more discretion over disclosures 
compared to the footnotes. Moreover, we expect opportunistic shifting behaviour between the 
narrative disclosures––reflected in low similarities between the MD&A and footnotes within 
the same firm––also to be associated with negative information. 
In a similar vein, it is suggested that managers engage in “impression management” by 
using discretion in the tone of narrative disclosures opportunistically to influence investor 
                                                          
5 Prior empirical evidence shows that accounting information that is recognized on the face of the financial 
statements features more heavily in investors’ decision making than when it is disclosed in the footnotes (Amir 
1993, Aboody 1996; Davis-Friday et al. 1999).  
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beliefs (Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007). Typical behaviour includes “concealment by 
obfuscating negative organisational outcomes and introducing positive bias” (Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan, 2007, p. 182) and by attributing good news to managers and bad news to 
external factors. Consequently, we expect the tone in the narratives, whether positive or 
negative, to influence the investor reaction to the information disclosed. However, we expect 
under the “impression management”-hypothesis that positive tone is negatively associated 
with future returns. Moreover, if management’s intent is to obfuscate negative information, 
we expect this negative news to be ‘buried’ in the footnotes and covered up with positive 
language, given their higher complexity and investors’ limited attention to them compared to 
the MD&A as outlined above. We now turn to empirically test these hypotheses. 
 
3. Sample Selection and Variables  
3.1. Sample Selection 
We obtain 10-K filings filed electronically with the SEC on EDGAR from 1993 to 2014. 
This yields 58,203 10-K filings from which we were able to parse the Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis and the Notes to the Financial Statements. We eliminate disclosures 
that contain fewer than 1000 characters. This is done to remove any filings that incorporate 
the MD&A or Footnotes by reference to the annual report. We remove all numerical tables, 
keeping only the text.  
Although there are other written or narrative sections in 10-K filings, the MD&A and 
Footnotes comprise the majority of these disclosures. Figure 1 shows the page length of 
Procter & Gamble’s 2014 10-K by section as an example. The MD&A and Footnotes are by 
far the longest disclosures, at 24 and 28 pages respectively, out of a total of approximately 75 
pages. This is a fairly typical pattern for public company 10-Ks, and is suggestive that the 
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MD&A and footnotes (jointly and separately) are of prime importance when studying the 
information content of narrative disclosures in 10-K filings. 
For each firm, we match the 10-K filings with stock return data on CRSP and accounting 
data on Compustat.6 Table 1 provides a summary of the sample construction and matching 
process. The sample size is further reduced in the analysis through the use of lagged variables 
and year-on-year changes, and exclusion of financial firms and late filers (where the 10-K is 
filed over 100 days after the accounting period date). Our final usable sample consist of 
28,712 10-K-years with extracted MD&A and footnote sections. 
3.2. MD&A and footnote characteristics 
We calculate a number of measures that are intended to capture important characteristics 
of the MD&A and footnote, which we expect to reflect the information content of these 
disclosures: length, year-on-year change, within-industry similarity, within-filing similarity 
between MD&A and footnotes, and sentiment.  
Disclosure length is a count of the number of words in the MD&A text, and the footnote 
text. In regressions we use total length (MD&A plus footnotes) and footnote length because it 
is easier to interpret: we can observe the effect of footnote length, holding constant the total 
length of disclosures. Hence for a given quantity of disclosure, we can see the effect of 
changing the composition of the disclosure (i.e. MD&A narrative discussion, or footnotes). 
Disclosure length provides us with a simple measure of information content. All other things 
being equal, a longer disclosure should contain more information, which will in turn affect 
how investors react to this information.7  
                                                          
6 We match the CIKs from the 10-K filings to GVKEYs using (a) CRSP/Compustat Merged Company Header 
History, (b) Compustat NAMES file, and (c) WRDS SEC Analytics Suite GVKEY-CIK link table. If these three 
sources are inconsistent, we use (a) first, then (b), then (c). For the full sample, there are GVKEY matches for 
approximately 82% of firm-years. With these GVKEY matches, we merge with Compustat and CRSP. 
7 We also use the log of word count, instead of the raw number, in further analyses. Other approaches of using 
the number of characters, or the number of words after removing stop words and words less than three 
characters long do not yield materially different results. 
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Year-on-year change is a measure of how much a firm-year’s MD&A and footnotes 
change compared to the previous fiscal year. Change is calculated as one minus the vector 
cosine similarity between this year’s MD&A (or footnote) text and the previous year’s 
MD&A (or footnote) text as a bag-of-words model.8 This results in a variable between zero 
and one, where zero indicates that the two bag-of-words vectors (e.g. this year’s MD&A and 
last year’s MD&A) have exactly the same proportion of words and one indicates that the two 
vectors are orthogonal and contain no shared content. 9 
A disclosure that contains more change is presumed to contain more information––a 
footnote that does not change compared to the previous year presumably contains very little 
new information to investors. By comparison, a disclosure that changes a lot provides 
information both through the new content itself, and through the fact that a decision was 
made to add, delete, or amend a part of the footnote.10  
Within-industry similarity measures how similar a firm’s MD&A (or footnotes) are 
compared to other firms in the same industry in the same year. Firms that have the same 
three-digit SIC code are considered to be in the same industry. For each firm-year, we 
calculate the vector cosine similarity between the disclosure (MD&A or footnote) and all 
other disclosures of the same type, in the same industry, in the same fiscal year. This results 
in a number of pairwise similarity metrics, which are averaged to provide the within-industry 
similarity for that firm-year, for both the MD&A and the footnotes. Within-industry 
                                                          
8 The bag-of-words model represents a document as a vector in which each element corresponds to the term 
frequency of a particular word. This means that the defining feature of a document in this model is the 
frequency of each word – word order is lost. We have experimented with using Levenshtein (1966) distance 
(essentially the minimum number of single character edits required to get from one document to another) as a 
measure of change but it is overly sensitive to changes in paragraph ordering, absent any change in content. 
Furthermore our measure does not consider numbers – if the textual structure of a disclosure stays the same but 
the numbers change, this measure will show no change. 
9 Vector cosine similarity measures are calculated after we force all words to lowercase, remove any remaining 
tags, punctuation, multiple whitespaces, stop words (generic, names, dates and numbers, geographic, currencies 
and any other words fewer than three characters in length). We use stop word lists available on Bill McDonald’s 
website: http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html 
10 Our discussions with practising accountants suggest that company accountants prefer the path of least 
resistance and will avoid changing disclosures too much unless completely necessary. This is consistent with 
ample evidence in behavioural economics that documents the importance of inertia and default choices in 
decision making. 
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similarity is intended to measure how similar a firm’s disclosures look to its peers, in the 
cross-section: if similarity is high, a firm’s MD&A or footnotes contain a lot of similar 
content to its peers (i.e. boilerplate, which may possibly be easier for investors to process, but 
may also possibly contain less information); if similarity is low, the disclosure content 
substantially differs from peers (i.e. more idiosyncratic disclosures, with potentially more 
information, but also possibly harder for investors to process).  
MD&A-Footnote similarity is a within-filing measure of how similar the MD&A text 
and footnote text are to each other, for a particular firm-year filing. It is calculated as the 
vector cosine similarity between a firm’s MD&A text and footnote text, for the same firm in 
the same year. Hence it is a measure of how much information is common to both parts of the 
disclosure within a firm-year filing. As this variable tends towards one, the MD&A and 
footnotes share more and more of the same words in the same proportion (proxying the 
amount of information that is common to both sections). For a given length of disclosure, as 
this variable decreases, the filing arguably contains more information, as there is less 
commonality between the MD&A and footnotes. However, within-filing differences may also 
suggest that management is presenting different information in their narrative discussion 
compared to the audited footnotes. 
Disclosure sentiment is measured as the proportion of negative and positive words as 
defined by Loughran and McDonald (2011). We count the number of words in each firm-year 
disclosure (MD&A and footnotes separately) and divide this by the total number of words in 
the text. Negative words are subtracted from positive words to yield a proportion of net 
positive words. To exploit the within-filing variation between MD&A disclosure and footnote 
disclosures, we also calculate the difference between MD&A net positive and footnote net 
positive proportions (MD&A-Footnote net positive). This variable, which we call Sentiment 
Spread, is intended to capture the difference in sentiment between a firm’s MD&A narrative 
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disclosure and its audited notes to the financial statements. A positive spread indicates 
positive sentiment in the MD&A section, which is in part forward-looking, that is not 
reflected or has not yet been incorporated into footnote disclosures (which one could argue 
are more backwards looking, as accounting by its nature captures past transactions). 
Alternatively, management’s narrative and discussion about the past fiscal year might be 
more positive than justified by the audited footnote disclosures. 
3.3. Dependent Variables and Other Controls  
We measure the information content of 10-K narrative disclosures based on a number of 
market-based variables: signed (CAR) and absolute (|CAR|) filing returns; 4-factor adjusted 
returns over the year following the 10-K filing (RET250); and 4-factor residual volatility 
(RMSE250) during the year following the 10-K filing. Filing returns are an estimate of how 
investors react at the time of the filing, assuming they read (and process) the disclosures 
immediately. If the narrative characteristics we measure in the 10-K filings matter, firms’ 
filing 10-Ks with certain narrative characteristics will experience statistically significant 
returns around the filing date. Returns and volatility over the subsequent year give us an 
estimate of whether these narrative characteristics have any predictive power for long-term 
effects. 
The filing return (CAR) is a firm’s stock return minus the value-weighted CRSP return, 
summed over the four-day window [-1, +2] surrounding the filing date of the firm’s 10-K. 
The absolute filing return (|CAR|) is the absolute value of CAR. The return window starts at 
one day before filing and finishes two days after to allow for information leakage, and filings 
being made after the close of market (Berkman and Truong, 2009). 
The 4-factor adjusted returns over the year (RET250) following the filing date are 
calculated as follows: for each firm-year, we regress daily stock returns on the excess market 
returns (MKT-RF), a size factor (small-minus-big), a value factor (high-minus-low) and a 
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momentum factor (up-minus-down) over the estimation window [-250, -21] relative to the 
10-K filing date, in order to estimate factor loadings. For each of the event windows [+3, 
+250] we compound the firm’s actual daily stock return, and expected daily stock return 
based on estimated factor loadings over the window. Adjusted return is then calculated as 
compounded raw return minus compounded expected return (i.e. the actual buy-and-hold 
return, minus the expected risk-adjusted buy-and-hold return).  
RMSE250 is the root-mean-squared-error from a 4-factor model of returns over the 
window [+3, +250] relative to the 10-K filing date. This variable represents how much, on 
average, a firm’s daily return deviates from its expected return over the course of the year 
based on a 4-factor model. We also calculate the RMSE for the year prior to the filing date to 
use as control variable.  
To explore in more detail what fundamental information 10-K disclosure characteristics 
may contain about current or future earnings we examine the variation between disclosures 
and contemporaneous and future changes in ROA. This may tell us whether the narratives in 
the MD&A and footnotes (both, or individually) contain information about future accounting 
profitability.   
The SEC requires certain forward-looking statements in the MD&A concerning “known 
material trends and uncertainties” and off-balance sheet arrangements while other forward-
looking disclosures, generally speaking, are optional (SEC, 2003). It is less clear, however, 
whether the footnotes contain relevant information about the firm’s prospects. Unlike the 
MD&A management is not protected by “safe harbour" provisions and thus is less likely to 
explicitly disclose any forward-looking information in the footnotes.11  
                                                          
11 Safe harbour was originally introduced by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and strengthened by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which intended to reduce 
frivolous securities litigation. 
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We calculate the change in return on assets (ΔROA) for the current and next fiscal year. 
Return on assets (ROA) is operating income after depreciation (OIADP) divided by total 
assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year.  
We further use following firm control variables: Log(market value) is the natural 
logarithm of the share price at the end of the fiscal year (PRCC_F) times number of shares 
outstanding (CSHPRI). Book-to-market is shareholders' equity (SEQ) divided by market 
value at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is the sum of short term (DLC) and long term 
debt (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year. Log(number of 
business segments) is the natural logarithm of the number of business (“BUSSEG”) or 
operating segments (“OPSEG”) reported for each firm-year in the Compustat Segments 
dataset, excluding segments with negative sales or a missing SIC code, as these usually relate 
to corporate costs or eliminations. Any firm-year with missing segment data in Compustat is 
assigned a value of one segment. All variables are winsorised at the 1% tails by fiscal year.  
 
4. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A provides summary statistics for our disclosure variables. Footnotes are 
on average 18% longer than the MD&A section. They have a mean (median) length of 8,832 
(7,640) words, compared to a mean (median) length of 7,470 (6,459) words for the MD&A. 
Year-on-year change is higher for the MD&A than the footnotes, although the difference is 
not substantial. Mean (median) change for footnotes is 6.0% (4.1%) versus 8.4% (6.3%) for 
the MD&A.  
Within-industry similarity is higher for footnotes, with a mean (median) value of 0.67 
(0.69) compared to 0.55 (0.55) for the MD&A. This suggests that within an industry, 
footnotes have more in common with each other, whereas the MD&A differs more between 
firms. The higher similarity for footnotes may be caused by the stricter requirements of the 
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audited financial statements, compared to the narrative and forward-looking MD&A in which 
managers are likely to have more discretion and scope in what they disclose. This would also 
be consistent with footnotes being more “boilerplate” compared to the MD&A. 
MD&A-Footnote similarity (the within-filing similarity between the MD&A and 
footnotes) has a mean (median) value of 0.64 (0.65). This level is quite close to the average 
footnote within-industry similarity, implying that within a 10-K, the MD&A and footnotes 
share about the same content as the footnotes share with other firms in the same industry. 
There are evidently significant differences between the types of information that are disclosed 
in the footnotes compared to the MD&A, i.e. they are not simply restatements of one another. 
There is also substantial spread in the MD&A-Footnote similarity variable, with a 10th 
percentile of 0.47 and a 90th percentile of 0.80, so some firms do in fact have a lot of overlap 
between these two disclosures, while others have much less.  
Both the MD&A and footnotes have a negative net positive word count (i.e. more 
negative than positive words), with the footnotes taking a mean (median) value of -1.45% (-
1.33%) versus -1.31% (-1.22%) for the MD&A.  
We also focus on the within-filing spread between net positive words in the MD&A and 
in the footnotes (MD&A-Footnote Net Positive). Although the average spread is not large 
(0.14% mean, 0.15% median) there is substantial variation across firm-years, with a 10th 
percentile value of -2.94% (MD&A is more negative than the footnotes) and a 90th percentile 
value of 1.49% (MD&A is more positive than the footnotes). We explore this variation later 
in the paper: We are interested in whether this Sentiment Spread is exists because the MD&A 
is more forward-looking, and thus this sentiment spread tells us something about future firm 
performance, or because a manager uses her discretion to write a narrative MD&A disclosure 
that diverges from underlying financial performance, or some combination of both.  
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Table 2 Panel B provides summary statistics for the market and accounting dependent 
variables. 10-K filing cumulative abnormal returns (from 1 day before the filing date to 2 
days after) have a mean value of -0.34% and a median of -0.20%. Absolute announcement 
returns have a mean value of 5.63% and a median of 3.33%. 1-year volatility has a mean 
value of 4.02% and median of 3.21%. Returns over the 1-year period following the 10-K 
filing date have a mean (median) of 4.36% and (-2.86%). Current year change on return on 
assets has a mean value of -0.95% and a median of -0.06%. 
Table 3 provides correlations for the main disclosure characteristics and other 
independent variables. MD&A and footnote textual characteristics are generally positively 
correlated with the MD&A and footnote length, except for the footnote industry similarity 
and MD&A positive tone. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Filing Returns 
Table 4 presents results from regressions of absolute filing returns (|CAR|) on disclosure 
variables and firm controls. Absolute filing returns are consistently increasing with total 
disclosure length, but decreasing in footnote length. A unit increase in the log of total 
disclosure length is associated with a highly significant increase in |CAR| of 155 basis points; 
a unit increase in the log of footnote length (holding total length constant) reduces |CAR| by 
38 basis points (Model 2). 12 These results suggest that MD&A disclosures are more 
informative to investors than footnote disclosures in the immediate days of the 10-K filing. 
This may obtain because the MD&A section contains more material information, is easier to 
process or attracts more immediate investor attention over the very short term. 
                                                          
12 Total length is the sum of MD&A and footnote length. Thus, an increase in the footnote holding total length 
constant means an equivalent decrease in the MD&A length. 
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The results are corroborated by the findings the change in the MD&A is associated with 
higher absolute announcement returns. A one standard deviation of MD&A change is 
associated with a 37 basis point increase in absolute announcement returns compared to a one 
standard deviation of a change in the footnote, which is weakly associated with |CAR| and 
results in a 7 basis point increase in absolute announcement returns. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms’ 10-K narratives that break from the default choice 
of simply repeating last year’s narrative contain valuable information for investors. Within 
these narratives year-on-year changes in the MD&A section seem especially informative to 
investors. 
 MD&A within-industry similarity is negatively associated with |CAR|. A one standard 
deviation increase in MD&A Industry Similarity correlates with a 13 basis point lower 
absolute return. This suggests that investors extract firm-specific information from the 
MD&A and that deviations from commonly used narratives within an industry have 
information content. Similarly, within 10-K-year, MD&A-Footnote Similarity is negatively 
associated with |CAR|: a one standard deviation increase in within-filing similarity lowers 
absolute announcement returns by 13 basis points. In other words, holding length constant, 
increasing the amount of common information between the MD&A and footnotes lowers the 
informativeness of these disclosures. 
Turning to the sentiment in the narratives, the proportion of net positive words in the 
footnotes, but not the MD&A, is negatively associated with absolute announcement returns. 
A one percentage point increase in net positive words in the footnotes is associated with a 30 
basis point lower |CAR|. At the same time, investors react more strongly to the incremental 
positive sentiment in the MD&A. These results could indicate that footnotes are more 
informative to investors with respect to negative information they contain about the firm 
consistent with prior findings in the literature that negative tone in the 10-K filing is 
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associated negatively with excess returns (e.g., Loughran and McDonald 2011), but this 
remains speculative at this point. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 broadly suggest that MD&A disclosures are more 
informative than footnotes as investors react more strongly to the length and particularly the 
change in the MD&A than the footnotes, but also find “boilerplate” MD&A (high within-
industry similarity), as one might expect, less informative.  
Next we investigate whether our narrative disclosure characteristics are associated with 
positive or negative filing returns. That is, we test whether the characteristics of the narratives 
in the MD&A and footnotes reflect any positive or negative information about the future 
prospects of the firm. Accordingly, Table 5 shows the results from regressions of signed 
filing returns (CAR) on our disclosure variables. Consistent with the results in Table 4 and 
our conjecture above footnotes seem to generally be informative with respect to negative 
news. Footnote length is associated with lower CARs. Similarly, confirming the information 
content of MD&A changes, the change in the MD&A is strongly negatively associated with 
CAR. A one standard deviation of MD&A change is associated with 38 basis points more 
negative filing returns, which suggests that changes in the MD&A narrative disclosure on 
average occur because of bad news. The lack of reaction to footnote change when controlling 
for MD&A change suggests either that footnotes are not incrementally informative, or that 
investors need longer than the filling days to process them given that they usually contain 
more technical information compared to the MD&A. We investigate this further in the next 
section. 
MD&A-Footnote Similarity is positively associated with CAR. A one standard deviation 
increase is related to 17 basis point higher CAR. Recall, that the relationship with absolute 
CAR is negative as shown in Table 4. The market generally considers similar (likely 
boilerplate) discussions in the MD&A and footnotes less informative, but views congruence 
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between the information in the MD&A and the footnotes as a positive signal. Significant 
differences between the two narratives signal negative news. They might, for example, be 
viewed negatively if they suggest that management may be trying to present a different 
business outlook in one of the narratives, e.g. emphasise certain business aspects in the 
MD&A, while stressing others in the footnotes or downplay negative information in the 
footnotes (for which disclosure is regulated and audited) with a relatively more positive tone 
in the MD&A section. 
5.2. Long-Term Returns and Volatility  
We next explore whether investors fully impound all information available in the MD&A 
and footnote sections contemporaneously or under-react to the narrative information in one or 
both sections due to limited attention or relatively higher extraction costs. Table 6 presents 
results from regressions of 1-year volatility (RMSE250) on our disclosure variables. Total 
disclosure length is positively related to future 1-year volatility, with a one unit increase in 
log(disclosure length) corresponding to a 52 basis point increase in RMSE250 (Model 2). 
Longer 10-K filings are generally associated with more complex disclosures (Li, 2008) that 
contain more information to process leading to higher future stock return volatility. Footnote 
length has the opposite effect, with a one unit increase in log(disclosure length) decreasing 
RMSE by 12 basis points. Holding total length constant a relatively longer footnote (less long 
MD&A) reduces future idiosyncratic volatility. This could obtain because footnotes contain 
more detailed audited information that help investors interpret the financial and nonfinancial 
information in the 10-Ks. However, the footnote effect is barely significant.13  
Consistent with MD&A disclosures driving future volatility a higher change in MD&A 
disclosures is associated with higher future volatility (one standard deviation corresponds to a 
                                                          
13 If the footnote length coefficient is zero, then both the MD&A and footnotes are affecting future volatility 
equally (through the total length variable). If the coefficient is negative, then the MD&A has a stronger effect on 
future volatility, as increasing the proportion of footnotes for a given length of total disclosure decreases future 
volatility. 
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4 basis point increase); the magnitude of the footnote change effect is similar, although it is 
not statistically significant.  
MD&A-Footnote similarity is positively related to future volatility with a one standard 
deviation increase in within-filing similarity increasing RMSE250 by 3.6 basis points. Firms 
whose disclosures are more orthogonal (i.e. the MD&A and footnotes each contain distinct 
information and thus have lower similarity) have lower subsequent volatility. In conjunction 
with the results on MD&A and footnote length these results suggest that the more 
information footnotes contain and the more this information is distinct from information 
contained in the MD&A the less the future uncertainty about the equilibrium price of the 
stock. This result is consistent with the effect of MD&A-Footnote similarity on absolute 
filing returns that suggests that the more dissimilar the two narrative disclosures are the more 
investors react immediately to the information contained in them. In other words, the more 
distinct information both narratives provide the larger the initial volatility as investors unpick 
the information and the lower the future volatility once investors have interpreted the 
information. 
Sentiment in the MD&A and footnotes both affect future volatility, with a one 
percentage point increase in MD&A and footnote net positive words decreasing RMSE250 
by 6 basis points and 4 basis points respectively. Negative sentiment increases future 
uncertainty about the firm (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). We also control for the prior 
year RMSE (which explains 66% of next year’s volatility) to take into account firm-level 
idiosyncratic volatility that is not explained by the other firm controls. 
Next we examine whether 10-K narrative characteristics are associated with future stock 
returns. If investors underreact to the information contained in these disclosures or if 
managers use these disclosures strategically to obscure or downplay negative information, the 
disclosure characteristics will be associated with future stock returns. Table 7 presents result 
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from regressions of 1-year 4-factor adjusted returns (RET250) on disclosure variables and 
firm controls. Both total disclosure length and footnote disclosure length have no predictive 
power for future returns.  
The most striking results come from year-on-year changes in the narratives. Changes to 
both the MD&A and footnotes are associated with substantially lower future returns. A one 
standard deviation change in MD&A and the footnotes corresponds to a -3.0 and -1.7 percent 
return, respectively, after controlling for risk factors. These results allow for two 
interpretations. First, changes in narrative disclosures are highly predictive of negative future 
performance. Second, investors underreact to the negative information in year-on-year 
changes in the narratives at the filing date. Recall that filing day returns are highly negative to 
MD&A changes, but not footnote changes, as presented in Table 5. That is, investors 
underreact in particular to changes in the footnote narratives. 
Consistent with the short-term results MD&A-Footnote similarity is positively related to 
future returns; a one standard deviation increase in within-filing similarity increases returns 
by 1.6 percentage points. Disclosing similar information in both disclosure outlets is seen as a 
positive signal by investors; if the disclosures are substantially different, managers may be 
attempting to hide negative information or otherwise present an alternate reality.  
MD&A sentiment is positively related to future returns, with one percentage point 
increase in sentiment leading to 98 basis point higher returns. Interestingly, over this longer 
time frame, footnote positive sentiment is negatively related to future returns: a one 
percentage point increase in footnote net positive words leads to a 130 basis point decrease in 
1-year return. Although this relationship is backwards to naïve expectations, it supports the 
idea that the footnotes and MD&A tend to contain different types of information with 
footnotes being more informative with respect to future risks. It also support our conjecture 
that footnotes––as the outlet that receives less attention from investors and is more costly to 
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process––are used to obfuscate negative information. Consistent with this the sentiment 
spread (MD&A-Footnote net positive words) is positively related to returns, with a one 
percentage point higher spread associated with 108 basis point higher returns.  
Moreover, once we condition the “sentiment spread” on firm profitability, we see a 
strong U-shaped effect: We interact MD&A-Footnote Net Positive with a dummy variable 
(=1 if firm is in bottom ROA quartile by year). When the dummy equals zero (profitable 
firms), a one percentage point increase in sentiment spread leads to 2.5 percentage point 
higher stock returns. For firms with low profitability, a one percentage point increase in 
sentiment spread leads to a 3.4% decrease in returns (Model 8). The positive part of this U-
shaped relationship (profitable firms) is consistent with managements’ narrative disclosures 
containing valuable forward-looking information. However, for unprofitable firms, a 
divergence between the sentiment of management’s narrative disclosure and the audited notes 
to the financial statements is a strong negative signal likely because management has 
discretion about the tone and content of the MD&A, but less so for footnotes. Management 
tends to be more positive in their view of firm prospects in the MD&A, and because investors 
seem to pay more attention to the MD&A than the footnotes, this divergence is not 
immediately clear to the market. This relationship is consistent with the aforementioned 
“managerial bias” view of disclosure, where managers’ narrative disclosure diverges from the 
underlying accounting reality. It is, of course, not possible to say whether this might be 
caused by intended discretion, or simply is the result of biases in the CEOs disclosure 
behaviour. We are somewhat agnostic about the underlying cause, but solely document the 
negative implications for investors.  
5.3. Operating performance 
Thus far we established that 10-K narrative disclosure characteristics are associated with 
filing returns and future stock returns and volatility. In this section we further examine 
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whether the 10-K narrative disclosures correlate with contemporaneously recognised (i.e. on 
the main financial statements) accounting performance and whether they are predictive of the 
future accounting performance of the firm mirroring the stock market performance.  
Table 8 shows results from regressions of contemporaneous change in return on assets 
(ΔROA(t)) on disclosure variables and firm controls. Length is negatively associated with 
contemporaneous change in profitability; a one unit increase in log(total disclosure length) 
correlates to a 323 basis point decrease in current ΔROA. This relationship is not affected by 
footnote length, so both MD&A and footnotes tend to be longer when a firm has a larger 
decrease in profitability. This could either be caused by losses requiring more disclosure than 
profitable results, or might be consistent with the conjecture of managerial obfuscation in the 
face of poor results. The two interpretations are difficult to distinguish based on these results 
on their own, but in conjunction with our findings above the latter seems likely.  
Change in the MD&A is correlated with a negative current year change in profitability: a 
one standard deviation increase in MD&A change accompanies a 64 basis point lower ΔROA 
whereas footnote change is not related to ΔROA, which is consistent with the results on stock 
returns. A one percentage point increase in MD&A sentiment accompanies a 61 basis point 
higher ΔROA. For sentiment spread the effect is 39 basis points. Again both results mirror 
the findings on the market reaction. We do not see a U-shaped effect in sentiment spread and 
(prior year) profitability in this case; in fact the relationship between sentiment spread and 
current ΔROA is twice as strong for low profitability firms, so MD&A language does 
correspond to current performance in all cases here.  
Turning to future change in profitability, both MD&A and footnotes have a strong 
relationship with future firm performance. Table 9 shows results from regressions of one-
year-ahead change in return on assets (ΔROA(t+1)) on disclosure variables and firm controls.  
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Total disclosure length has a weak negative relationship with future profitability, but this 
disappears after controlling for footnote disclosure length. We also see a relationship between 
MD&A change and future profitability that we see with future returns: a one standard 
deviation change in MD&A predicts a 56 basis point lower ΔROA. Footnote change does not 
have predictive power on future profitability. Firms with higher MD&A-Footnote similarity 
(within-filing) have moderately higher future changes in profitability, with a one standard 
deviation increase in within-filing similarity leading to 21 basis point higher ΔROA(t+1). 
This is a similar relationship to the one we observe for future one-year returns, and is 
consistent with high common disclosures between footnotes and MD&A being a positive 
signal. Footnote sentiment is negatively related to ΔROA, with a one percentage point 
increase predicting a 27 basis point decrease in future profitability. Although this negative 
relationship between positive sentiment and future performance is counterintuitive, it is 
consistent with the pattern we see in 1-year future returns and confirms our conjecture about 
managerial obfuscation of bad underlying financial results using positive sounding narratives.  
Although sentiment spread is not significant by itself, when it is interacted with a “low 
profitability” dummy variable, the U-shaped relationship we found with stock returns is 
corroborated. For “high profitability” firms (not in lowest quartile by year), sentiment spread 
(MD&A-Footnote net positive) is strongly related to future ΔROA, with a one percentage 
point increase in spread related to a 37 basis point increase in next year’s profitability. For 
“low profitability” firms (bottom quartile of ROA), a one percentage point increase in 
sentiment spread predicts a 92 basis point lower ΔROA. Firms with reasonable profitability 
seem to use the MD&A to signal future performance; for low profitability firms, it seems that 
a manager’s optimism is inversely related to the reality of future performance.  
5.4. Interpretation of results and further tests 
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The analyses in this paper show a number of results in which MD&A and footnote 
disclosure characteristics are predictive of contemporaneous and long-term stock returns, 
volatility and future changes in firms’ profitability. We find that investors’ reaction to the 
MD&A narrative in 10-Ks is much stronger and more timely than their reaction to the notes 
to the financial statements. Textual characteristics of 10-K filings are predictive of future 
returns, volatility, and firm profitability. This predictive power suggests that investors do not 
fully process 10-K written disclosures when they are filed, perhaps due to limited attention or 
information processing biases. Investors muted short-term reaction to the footnotes could be 
because there is no marginal information of value compared to the MD&A, or because the 
footnotes are more difficult or costly to process. Our evidence suggests the latter, as footnote 
characteristics are related to long-term returns, volatility and profitability.  
We also find some evidence of managers’ attempts to obfuscate negative information in 
the MD&A narrative and particularly the footnotes through tone. Both are associated with 
negative subsequent stock returns, particularly for underperforming firms. It is of course 
difficult to distinguish intentional reporting choices from unintentional biases in reporting 
behavior. We investigate this further by examining the relationship of the narrative 
characteristics with future discretionary accruals. The untabulated results are consistent with 
the prior patterns of associations of MD&A and footnote characteristics with future stock 
returns and profitability. Longer footnote disclosures (holding total length constant) predict 
higher discretionary accruals and MD&A within-industry similarity and footnote within-
industry similarity have statistically significant and opposite effects on discretionary accruals. 
Firms with higher footnote similarity (i.e. more boilerplate disclosure, less idiosyncratic 
disclosure) show evidence of subsequently higher earnings management, while firms with 
higher MD&A similarity show signs of lower subsequent earnings management. 
 30 
 
From the perspective of management, the MD&A is the more visible disclosure (given 
its relationship with signed and absolute announcement returns), and also allows greater 
discretion due to safe harbour laws and the fact that it is not (strictly) audited.14 By making 
the MD&A less comparable to other companies, it will be more difficult for investors to 
process this information and assess the firm’s situation in context. In contrast, higher 
similarity in the footnotes may be a result of managers in turn trying to avoid disclosures that 
indicate to outsiders that something is wrong or different. One possible explanation could be 
that managers actively choose what information to put into the MD&A, where they have 
greater discretion, and then simply try to structure the footnotes to minimise informative 
disclosures, in efforts to maximise obfuscation. Admittedly, this argument is speculative and 
very difficult to test. Nevertheless, the overall consistent patterns in the results suggest that 
this is a likely possibility. Our results also show consistent patterns in the relationship 
between the narrative sections within 10-K filings. The MD&A and the footnotes have 
differing, and sometimes opposite effects on stock returns and profitability. The fact that the 
signs of the association of the tone in the two narratives differ supports the notion that the 
MD&A and footnotes are fundamentally different disclosure outlets.   
Our results also suggest limited attention of investors and biases in information 
processing, that is the marginal investor’s inability to read and process the complex 
information contained within a 10-K filing in a timely manner. It is conceivable, for example, 
that the marginal investors make decisions partly based on stale information that is disclosed 
in the most recent, and previous, 10-Ks. For these investors, the information may be “new”, 
because they have not taken it upon themselves to read (in detail) years of prior 10-Ks for 
companies that were not previously on their “investment radar”. Given the time constraints 
                                                          
14 Auditors can be engaged to review the MD&A, even though it is not subject to accounting standards in the 
same way as the notes to the financial statements. Nevertheless, auditors will typically check that the MD&A is 
consistent with the figures presented in the audited statements (AICPA, 2001). 
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and portfolio size of even institutional investors, and the limited availability of machine-
readable 10-K narrative sections up to recently this is at least a possibility.  
On the other hand, the relationships we observe on long-term stock returns might be 
driven by compensation for some type of information risk that is captured by disclosure 
characteristics. Easley and O’Hara (2004) produce an asset pricing model in which a firm’s 
information environment affects the cost of capital, whereby cost of capital is decreasing in 
information quality (i.e. less private information) and information precision. Increasing the 
difficulty of testing theoretical predictions, Lambert et al. (2007) and Gao (2010) show that 
the direction of the relationship between cost of capital and disclosure quality is very much 
ambiguous and Kothari et al. (2009) show empirically that measures of disclosure quality and 
disclosure content are often conflated. Yet, although, risk-based explanations of our findings 
are possible, many of the relationships that we observe in the data are more consistent with 
managers exploiting limited investor attention. 
There are a range of other mandatory and voluntary disclosures that are ignored in this 
study: quarterly 10-Q filings, management forecasts, earnings announcements and pre-
announcements, and so on. If characteristics of these disclosures are correlated with 10-K 
disclosures, there is a possibility that we are capturing some unobserved effects. However, 
the 10-K is arguably the most difficult to process piece of information disclosed by US firms; 
other disclosures are shorter and easier to digest. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the characteristics and variations within firms’ 10-K filings over a 
20 year sample period. We find that MD&A disclosures are more informative to investors 
than footnote disclosures in the immediate days of the 10-K filing. Our results further suggest 
that firms’10-K narratives that break from the default choice of simply repeating last year’s 
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narrative or from being boilerplate disclosures commonly used within the industry are 
informative to investors. However, consistent with limited attention or high processing costs, 
we also find that investors generally under-react to negative information contained in the 10-
K narratives as their characteristics are highly predictive of negative future stock returns after 
controlling for risk factors as well as associated with significantly lower future operating 
performance. Our results are also suggestive of managers’ incentives to exploit investors’ 
limited attention through disclosure tone and through the disclosure of information that is 
different in nature and content in the MD&A section compared to the footnotes. 
The findings in this paper have implications for regulators, accounting standard-setters, 
and preparers of financial statements. For regulators and standard-setters, the differential 
between investors’ reactions to the MD&A narrative and their reaction to the Notes to the 
Financial Statements may be concerning. The current Chairwoman of the SEC has expressed 
the need for disclosure reform to tackle the “information overload” (White, 2013) that 
investors face as a result of excessive, boilerplate, or complex disclosures. Big Four firms are 
currently proposing changes to MD&A and footnote disclosures to improve presentation to 
investors (EY, 2014). Our research adds to this debate by highlighting areas of disclosure that 
investors seem to have greater difficulty processing. For the preparers of financial statements, 
this research has obvious implications about how to structure disclosures to provide more 
effective and digestible disclosures to the market, or conversely how to enhance earnings 
management and obscure information from investors. For investors the message is clear: 
there is value in reading companies’ annual reports, and especially understanding the cause of 
changes to narrative disclosures and footnotes. 
Further research could study the relative characteristics of within-firm voluntary and 
mandatory disclosures to produce a comprehensive picture of how managers vary disclosure 
by outlet, and the effects on investor reaction and information content. This is beyond the 
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scope of this study. Nonetheless, this research details significant information content in 
accounting disclosures and differences in the impact of characteristics of the MD&A and 
footnotes. 
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Figure 1. Procter & Gamble 10-K for the year ended 30 June 2014. This table provides a breakdown of the 
length of Procter & Gamble’s 2014 10-K by section, including the item number and title for each section, as 
well as a page count. Proxy indicates that the 10-K refers to the firm’s proxy filing (DEF 14A). 
 
 
Item Title # Pages
Part I
1 Business 2
1A Risk Factors 3.5
1B, 2, 3, 4 Miscellaneous 0.5
Executive Officers 2
Part II
5 Stock price, dividends, repurchases 4
6 Selected Financial Data 1
7 Management's Discussion and Analysis 24
8 Financial Statements 8
Notes to the Financial Statements 28
Part III
10, 11 Corporate governance and executive compensation Proxy
12 Employee share plans 2
13, 14, 15 Related parties, director independence Proxy
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Table 1. Sample Construction. This table shows the sample selection process of the Management Discussion 
& Analysis (MD&A) and Notes to the Financial Statements (Footnotes) from 1993-2014. The process involves 
downloading all available 10-K filings from the SEC EDGAR database, extracting the MD&A and Footnotes, 
matching CIK firm identifiers to GVKEYs (Compustat) and PERMNOs (CRSP), and merging the data with 
CRSP and Compustat. 
Initial sample of extracted MD&A and Footnotes 58,203 
MD&A and Footnotes < 1000 characters (6,198) 
Duplicate CIK-fiscal years (94) 
No GVKEY match (9,265) 
No PERMNO match (9,937) 
Missing Compustat data (missing Total Assets) (2,882) 
Missing CRSP return data (missing 1-year raw ret.) (1,115) 
Final usable sample 28,712 
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Table 2. Sample Summary Statistics.  
This table shows summary statistics for the sample of firm-years with both MD&A and Footnote disclosures 
available from 1993 to 2014. Panel A shows summary statistics for variables related to MD&A and Footnote 
disclosures. Variables are defined in Section 3 of the text. Length is the number of words in a disclosure after 
removing tables; Change is one minus a firm’s year-on-year vector cosine similarity; Within-Industry Similarity 
is the average pairwise similarity between a firm’s disclosures and all other firms’ disclosures in a given year, 
within three-digit SIC code industry; MD&A-Footnote Similarity is the vector cosine similarity between the 
MD&A disclosure and Footnote disclosure within a firm-year filing; Sentiment is the number of Loughran-
McDonald (2011) financial sentiment words as a percentage of words in each disclosure; Net Positive is the 
percentage of Positive words minus the percentage of Negative words within a firm-year disclosure. 
Panel B shows summary statistics for the dependent variables measuring investor response and firm 
performance. Variables are defined in Section 3 of the text. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
return in the [-1, +2] window around the 10-K filing date. Absolute CAR is the absolute value of CAR. RMSE 
(20 day) and RMSE (1 year) are the root-mean-squared-errors of a 4-factor returns model for the windows [+3, 
+20] and [+3, +250] following the 10-K filing date, respectively. 4 Factor Return (1 month) and 4 Factor Return 
(1 year) are the difference between a firm’s buy-and-hold return minus a buy-and-hold risk-adjusted benchmark 
return over the windows [+3, +20] and [+3, +250] following the 10-K filing date, respectively. ΔROA (t) and 
ΔROA (t+1) are the change in return on assets for the current and subsequent fiscal year, respectively. 
Discretionary Accruals (t) and Discretionary Accruals (t+1) are the Jones Model discretionary accruals 
estimated cross-sectionally within 2-digit SIC codes, for the current and subsequent fiscal year respectively. 
 
Panel A: Disclosure Variables 
Panel B: Dependent Variables 
 
  
Disclosure Variables Mean St. Dev. 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99%
Footnote Length (Words) 8,832 5,186 1,377 3,748 5,226 7,640 11,117 15,355 27,577
MD&A Length (Words) 7,470 4,722 1,251 2,645 3,984 6,459 9,764 13,569 24,052
Footnote Change 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.41
MD&A Change 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.36
Footnote Within-Industry Sim. 0.67 0.10 0.34 0.54 0.62 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.81
MD&A Within Industry Sim. 0.55 0.10 0.32 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.68 0.78
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 0.64 0.13 0.30 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.74 0.80 0.90
Footnote Sentiment
Positive 0.95% 0.33% 0.30% 0.57% 0.73% 0.92% 1.14% 1.38% 1.95%
Negative 2.40% 0.96% 0.62% 1.29% 1.74% 2.28% 2.93% 3.69% 5.25%
"Net Positive" -1.45% 0.98% -4.31% -2.75% -1.99% -1.33% -0.78% -0.31% 0.45%
MD&A Sentiment
Positive 1.43% 0.55% 0.47% 0.81% 1.05% 1.35% 1.73% 2.15% 3.10%
Negative 2.74% 1.20% 0.58% 1.35% 1.88% 2.58% 3.45% 4.39% 6.06%
"Net Positive" -1.31% 1.23% -4.56% -2.94% -2.07% -1.22% -0.47% 0.18% 1.28%
Net Positive: MD&A - FN 0.14% 1.12% -2.63% -1.27% -0.55% 0.15% 0.83% 1.49% 2.94%
Dependent Variables Mean St. Dev. 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99%
CAR -0.34% 8.45% -26.73% -8.86% -3.57% -0.20% 3.07% 8.04% 25.39%
Absolute CAR 5.63% 6.85% 0.07% 0.54% 1.42% 3.33% 7.07% 13.48% 33.53%
RMSE (1 year) 4.02% 2.91% 0.80% 1.39% 2.03% 3.21% 5.06% 7.67% 15.32%
4 Factor Return (1 year) 4.36% 81.82% -159.30% -67.71% -33.15% -2.86% 26.95% 71.92% 303.51%
ΔROA (t) -0.95% 14.54% -55.59% -11.85% -3.45% -0.06% 2.51% 8.62% 46.12%
ΔROA (t+1) -1.02% 14.60% -55.10% -11.94% -3.41% -0.06% 2.48% 8.47% 46.57%
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Table 3. Correlations. This table shows Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) correlations for disclosure and firm characteristics. Variables are 
defined in Table 2, and Section 3 of the text. * denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Footnote Log-Length 0.7460* 0.1122* 0.1499* -0.0400* 0.0820* 0.3672* 0.1589* 0.3746* -0.0701* 0.1522* 0.3970* 0.002 0.0216* 0.0956* 0.3433*
2 MD&A Log-Length 0.7549* 0.0516* 0.2067* -0.0668* 0.1326* 0.2861* 0.0961* 0.3042* 0.0011 0.3001* 0.3952* 0.0053 0.0306* 0.0350* 0.3239*
3 Footnote Change 0.1832* 0.1075* 0.2615* 0.2839* 0.0687* 0.0936* 0.0529* 0.018 0.0155 -0.0252* 0.0585* -0.0005 0.0266* -0.0112 0.0317*
4 MD&A Change 0.1659* 0.2792* 0.4317* 0.0695* 0.2527* 0.1629* 0.0693* 0.0430* -0.0359* -0.0285* 0.1159* 0.0079 0.1152* -0.0579* 0.0618*
5 Footnote Industry Similarity -0.1748* -0.1667* 0.0908* 0.0034 0.4686* 0.0507* 0.0203* 0.0259* 0.0202* 0.0346* -0.0954* 0.0081 -0.0146 -0.0945* -0.1071*
6 MD&A Industry Similarity 0.0128 0.0477* 0.0288* 0.1112* 0.4128* 0.2087* 0.0529* 0.0671* -0.0372* 0.0970* 0.0119 0.0058 0.0616* -0.0533* -0.0646*
7 MD&A-Footnote Similarity 0.3734* 0.3066* 0.0294* 0.1229* -0.1025* 0.1812* 0.1644* 0.2558* -0.0948* 0.1215* 0.1061* 0.0069 0.0503* 0.1032* 0.1338*
8 Footnote % positive 0.2277* 0.1420* 0.0801* 0.0652* -0.0347* 0.0429* 0.1629* 0.0854* 0.3380* 0.0401* 0.1272* -0.0072 -0.0152 -0.0176* 0.0977*
9 Footnote % negative 0.4077* 0.3367* -0.0106 0.0323* -0.0461* 0.0392* 0.2230* 0.1057* -0.0223* 0.4844* 0.0403* -0.0123 -0.0726* -0.0053 0.0941*
10 MD&A % positive -0.0548* 0.0548* 0.0095 -0.013 0.0590* 0.0493* -0.0609* 0.3332* 0.0122 0.1501* 0.0822* -0.0133 -0.0136 -0.0496* 0.0160*
11 MD&A % negative 0.1434* 0.2768* -0.0435* -0.0363* 0.0338* 0.0951* 0.1466* 0.0413* 0.4969* 0.1719* -0.0718* 0.0163* -0.1090* -0.0249* 0.0728*
12 Log Market Capitalisation 0.4214* 0.4271* 0.1351* 0.1645* -0.1181* 0.0478* 0.0961* 0.1775* 0.0397* 0.0827* -0.0925* -0.0354* 0.2504* -0.0211* 0.3029*
13 Boot-to-market -0.0605* -0.0668* 0.0229* 0.0094 0.0078 0.0482* 0.0841* -0.0376* 0.0328* -0.0625* 0.1506* -0.3683* 0.0082 -0.0347* -0.0021
14 ROA -0.0500* -0.0262* 0.0865* 0.1503* -0.0270* 0.0275* -0.0065 -0.0218* -0.1967* 0.0134 -0.2514* 0.4066* -0.1877* -0.1272* 0.1175*
15 Leverage 0.1986* 0.0789* 0.0063 -0.0735* -0.1037* 0.0014 0.1833* -0.0209* -0.0376* -0.0816* -0.0419* 0.0231* -0.0037 0.0392* 0.0414*
16 Number of Business Segments 0.3028* 0.2766* 0.0823* 0.0658* -0.1273* -0.0798* 0.1465* 0.1046* 0.0693* 0.0024 0.0619* 0.2549* 0.0811* 0.1251* 0.1344*
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Table 4. Absolute Announcement Returns. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of Absolute CAR 
(dependent variable) on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 48 
industry classification) and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in 
Table 2, and Section 3 of the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Log-Length 1.17*** 1.55*** 1.65*** 1.65*** 1.57*** 1.32*** 1.62***
(8.89) (7.89) (4.87) (7.48) (7.82) (6.85) (8.28)
Footnote Log-Length -0.38** -0.37 -0.44** -0.29* -0.45*** -0.44***
(-2.42) (-1.52) (-2.32) (-1.79) (-2.78) (-2.83)
MD&A Change 5.21***
(6.13)
Footnote Change 1.05*
(1.76)
MD&A Industry Similarity -1.38*
(-1.97)
Footnote Industry Similarity 0.44
(0.67)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity -1.03**
(-2.16)
MD&A Net Positive % -0.05
(-1.37)
Footnote Net Positive % -0.30***
(-4.53)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. 0.07*
(1.84)
Log Market Capitalisation -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.63*** -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.65*** -0.66***
(-15.31) (-15.60) (-11.87) (-14.60) (-15.62) (-16.34) (-15.33)
Book-to-market -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04
(-0.46) (-0.45) (0.17) (-0.76) (-0.45) (-0.75) (-0.45)
ROA -4.17*** -4.16*** -4.33*** -4.07*** -4.16*** -3.95*** -4.16***
(-5.79) (-5.83) (-6.26) (5.79) (-5.83) (-6.13) (-5.85)
ΔROA 0.34 0.34 0.73 0.29 0.34 0.25 0.34
(0.52) (0.52) (1.42) (0.44) (0.52) (0.41) (0.52)
Leverage 1.20*** 1.17*** 1.05*** 1.15*** 1.17*** 1.13*** 1.17***
(4.93) (4.82) (4.76) (4.71) (4.94) (4.84) (4.82)
Log Number of Business Segments -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(-0.72) (-0.79) (-0.57) (-1.10) (-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.79)
N 22,964 22,964 14,929 22,344 22,964 22,964 22,964
Adjusted R² 0.500 0.500 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.501 0.500
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
Error Clustering Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
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Table 5. Signed Announcement Returns. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of CAR (dependent 
variable) on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 48 industry 
classification) and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in Table 2, 
and Section 3 of the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Log-Length -0.41** -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 0.02 0.02
(-2.09) (-0.12) (-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.21) (0.05) (0.08)
Footnote Log-Length -0.37* -0.17 -0.32 -0.49** -0.44* -0.42*
(-1.86) (-0.78) (-1.45) (-2.57) (-2.00) (-1.95)
MD&A Change -5.44***
(-4.60)
Footnote Change -0.44
(-0.46)
MD&A Industry Similarity 0.80
(1.00)
Footnote Industry Similarity -0.16
(-0.22)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 1.29***
(2.86)
MD&A Net Positive % 0.07
(1.02)
Footnote Net Positive % -0.09
(-1.57)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. 0.07
(1.22)
Log Market Capitalisation -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
(-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.34) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.33) (-1.30)
Book-to-market 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.10) (0.10) (0.59) (0.11) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14)
ROA 3.33*** 3.33*** 3.42*** 3.34*** 3.32*** 3.30*** 3.31***
(6.41) (6.40) (5.55) (6.31) (6.40) (6.21) (6.39)
ΔROA -0.31 -0.31 -0.38 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
(-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.63) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.62)
Leverage 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.07
(0.22) (0.22) (0.39) (0.26) (0.17) (0.24) (0.23)
Log Number of Business Segments 0.28* 0.28* 0.34* 0.27* 0.28* 0.28* 0.28*
(1.80) (1.81) (1.92) (1.71) (1.83) (1.81) (1.81)
N 22,964 22,964 14,929 22,344 22,964 22,964 22,964
Adjusted R² 0.019 0.019 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
Error Clustering Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
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Table 6. One-Year Future Volatility. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of 1-year 4-factor 
RMSE (dependent variable) on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 
48 industry classification) and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in 
Table 2, and Section 3 of the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Log-Length 0.39*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.49***
(10.33) (6.46) (5.86) (6.15) (6.54) (4.66) (6.17)
Footnote Log-Length -0.12* -0.12 -0.13* -0.15** -0.10 -0.10
(-1.95) (-1.43) (-1.86) (-2.16) (-1.60) (-1.67)
MD&A Change 0.55**
(2.64)
Footnote Change 0.48
(1.50)
MD&A Industry Similarity 0.08
(0.49)
Footnote Industry Similarity 0.03
(0.16)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 0.28**
(2.15)
MD&A Net Positive % -0.06***
(-4.65)
Footnote Net Positive % -0.04*
(-1.77)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. -0.02*
(-1.93)
Prior Year RMSE 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.66***
(35.93) (35.81) (30.49) (34.99) (35.63) (35.16) (35.86)
Log Market Capitalisation -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23***
(-14.93) (-15.04) (-12.11) (-14.61) (-14.81) (-15.31) (-14.84)
Book-to-market 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.06) (0.07) (0.31) (0.25) (0.02) (-0.29) (0.01)
ROA -1.55*** -1.56*** -1.66*** -1.54*** -1.56*** -1.51*** -1.55***
(-8.50) (-8.58) (-7.50) (-8.58) (-8.64) (-9.34) (-8.61)
ΔROA -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.32** -0.30*** -0.30** -0.32*** -0.31***
(-2.70) (-2.71) (-2.36) (-2.70) (-2.69) (-2.76) (-2.71)
Leverage 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.82***
(10.03) (9.86) (7.08) (9.64) (9.63) (9.56) (9.88)
Log Number of Business Segments -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03* -0.03
(-1.42) (1.53) (-0.52) (-1.26) (-1.42) (-1.78) (-1.55)
N 22,991 22,991 14,946 22,371 22,991 22,991 22,991
Adjusted R² 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
Error Clustering Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry
 45 
 
Table 7. One-Year Future Returns. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of 1-year 4-factor returns 
(dependent variable) on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 48 
industry classification) and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in 
Table 2, and Section 3 of the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Log-Length 1.21 4.51 3.87 4.29 4.24 5.31 5.55 4.84
(0.64) (1.09) (0.69) (0.99) (1.01) (1.27) (1.35) (1.23)
Footnote Log-Length -3.27 -3.01 -3.45 -4.47 -4.20 -4.18 -3.75
(-0.93) (-0.61) (-0.94) (-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.09)
MD&A Change -43.02***
(-4.19)
Footnote Change -24.92**
(-2.36)
MD&A Industry Similarity 4.88
(0.48)
Footnote Industry Similarity 4.52
(0.63)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 12.69***
(2.73)
MD&A Net Positive % 0.98*
(1.74)
Footnote Net Positive % -1.30**
(-2.06)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. 1.08* 2.48***
(2.01) (5.87)
Low Quartile ROA Dummy (D) -0.41
(-0.21)
(D) x MD&A-FN Net. Pos. -5.62***
(-3.97)
Log Market Capitalisation -2.97*** -2.98*** -3.33*** -3.05*** -2.96*** -3.00*** -3.02*** -3.46***
(-7.73) (-7.86) (-8.03) (-8.54) (-7.85) (-8.26) (-8.10) (-8.27)
Book-to-market 7.12*** 7.12*** 7.14*** 6.59*** 7.10*** 7.16*** 7.18*** 6.99***
(4.81) (4.82) (3.60) (4.67) (4.83) (4.80) (4.83) (4.63)
ROA 18.59*** 18.49*** 18.07*** 18.67*** 18.39*** 18.52*** 18.34*** 18.08**
(2.89) (2.87) (2.73) (2.86) (2.84) (2.91) (2.86) (2.58)
ΔROA -15.12* -15.09* -20.64** -15.33* -15.04* -15.18* -15.11* -16.22*
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-2.24) (-1.83) (-1.81) (-1.83) (-1.82) (-1.98)
Leverage -1.25 -0.96 -3.35 -0.98 -1.14 -0.97 -0.93 -0.82
(-0.29) (-0.22) (-0.58) (-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.28)
Log Num. of Business Segments 1.37 1.43 1.48 1.17 1.45 1.44 1.45 1.32
(1.36) (1.41) (1.09) (1.18) (1.42) (1.41) (1.42) (1.21)
N 22,991 22,991 14,946 22,371 22,991 22,991 22,991 22,991
Adjusted R² 0.046 0.046 0.052 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
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Table 8. Contemporaneous ΔROA. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of ΔROA (t) (dependent 
variable) on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 48 industry 
classification) and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in Table 2, 
and Section 3 of the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Log-Length -2.99*** -3.23*** -3.25*** -3.14*** -3.28*** -2.32*** -2.85***
(-3.67) (-3.51) (-3.82) (-3.40) (-3.59) (-2.83) (-3.17)
Footnote Log-Length 0.24 0.35 0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.09
(0.47) (0.65) (0.10) (0.02) (-0.20) (-0.17)
MD&A Change -9.13***
(-3.63)
Footnote Change -0.92
(-0.44)
MD&A Industry Similarity 0.10
(0.05)
Footnote Industry Similarity 1.33
(0.74)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 2.46
(2.88)
MD&A Net Positive % 0.61***
(9.21)
Footnote Net Positive % -0.02
(-0.22)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. 0.39***
(6.57)
Log Market Capitalisation 1.31*** 1.31*** 1.21*** 1.35*** 1.32*** 1.24*** 1.29***
(4.90) (4.89) (3.87) (4.88) (4.89) (4.62) (4.79)
Book-to-market 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.34 0.43 0.38
(1.01) (1.01) (0.52) (1.04) (0.99) (1.24) (1.10)
ROA (t-1) -13.61*** -13.61*** -13.16*** -13.63*** -13.62*** -13.84*** -13.65***
(-4.61) (-4.61) (-3.26) (-4.57) (-4.61) (-4.61) (-4.62)
Leverage -0.57 -0.56 0.10 -0.43 -0.61 -0.46 -0.54
(-0.88) (-0.85) (0.17) (-0.63) (-0.91) (-0.71) (-0.83)
Log Number of Business Segments 0.34* 0.34* 0.24 0.42** 0.35* 0.35* 0.35*
(1.80) (1.83) (1.21) (2.20) (1.88) (1.84) (1.88)
N 23,038 23,038 14,975 22,417 23,038 23,038 23,038
Adjusted R² 0.101 0.101 0.107 0.101 0.101 0.103 0.102
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
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Table 9. Future ΔROA. This table shows the results of OLS regressions of ΔROA (t+1) (dependent variable) 
on disclosure and firm characteristics. The regressions use industry (Ken French’s 48 industry classification) 
and fiscal year fixed effects. Errors are clustered by industry. Variables are defined in Table 2, and Section 3 of 
the text. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Log-Length -0.85* -0.47 -0.86 -0.47 -0.50 -0.65 -0.39 -0.29
(-1.73) (-0.63) (-1.45) (-0.52) (-0.67) (-0.88) (-0.53) (-0.38)
Footnote Log-Length -0.38 -0.15 -0.39 -0.53 -0.43 -0.45 -0.43
(-0.87) (-0.36) (-0.75) (-1.19) (-0.92) (-0.96) (-0.93)
MD&A Change -7.88**
(-2.51)
Footnote Change -2.33
(-1.32)
MD&A Industry Similarity -1.10
(-0.34)
Footnote Industry Similarity -0.11
(-0.08)
MD&A-Footnote Similarity 1.62*
(1.89)
MD&A Net Positive % -0.03
(-0.33)
Footnote Net Positive % -0.27**
(-2.01)
MD&A-Footnote Net. Pos. 0.09 0.37***
(0.87) (3.24)
Low Quartile ROA Dummy (D) -2.86***
(-3.35)
(D) x MD&A-FN Net. Pos. -1.29***
(-4.58)
Log Market Capitalisation 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29***
(4.32) (4.34) (2.85) (4.61) (4.47) (4.22) (4.24) (4.24)
Book-to-market -0.43** -0.43** -0.31* -0.46** -0.43** -0.45** -0.42** -0.42**
(-2.22) (-2.24) (-1.70) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-2.28) (-2.22) (-2.22)
ROA -15.62*** -15.63*** -15.22*** -15.52*** -15.64*** -15.49*** -15.64*** -15.64***
(-8.28) (8.30) (-7.52) (-8.06) (-8.29) (-8.31) (-8.29) (-8.29)
ΔROA -12.26*** -12.26*** -14.15*** -12.35*** -12.26*** -12.32*** -12.26*** -12.26***
(-4.94) (-4.95) (-4.82) (-4.93) (4.94) (-5.01) (-4.95) (-4.95)
Leverage 4.73*** 4.77*** 4.51*** 4.74*** 4.76*** 4.75*** 4.78*** 4.78***
(7.17) (7.20) (5.89) (7.10) (7.13) (7.25) (7.22) (7.22)
Log Num. of Business Segments 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89***
(4.39) (4.49) (3.78) (4.36) (4.55) (4.53) (4.49) (4.49)
N 20,862 20,862 13,587 20,288 20,862 20,862 20,862 20,862
Adjusted R² 0.113 0.113 0.122 0.113 0.114 0.114 0.113 0.118
Fixed Effects Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind. Year & Ind.
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